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settlement of the estate.4 3 These should not be deemed as exclusive, and
innocent third party banks should not be forced to carry a heavy liability
to serve those ends. The IM/arin case loosens the absolute grip of the
trustee on the property of the bankrupt, and, in so doing, achieves
another end which should be sought in bankruptcy proceedings. If the
Court would have placed the decision on surer grounds, we could be
sure of further equitable results in this area. As it is, we can only hope
that the Court will continue on its present path.
PATRICK M. RYAN
Criminal Law: Self-Incrimination: Right to Counsel: After
having been indicted for conspiring to rob a federally insured
bank and after counsel had been appointed to represent him, the accused
was placed in a lineup for identification purposes. In the lineup he was
required to repeat the words used by the robber, as were the others in
the lineup. His appointed counsel was not notified and was not present.
Although the United States Supreme Court held in United States v.
Wade1 that the accused's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination had not been infringed, it did hold that his Sixth Amend-
ment right to the assistance of counsel had been violated. While the
opinion of the Court and the separate opinions of Justices Black,
White and Fortas are helpful in clarifying certain questions in the
law, they do raise further questions which are left unanswered.
The first part of the Court's opinion relates to the alleged violation
of the accused's privilege against self-incrimination. There are two basic
theories of what constitutes self-incrimination. The first is that self-
incrimination includes any compulsion of an individual to cooperate in
any way in his prosecution. The second is that self-incrimination includes
only compelled communication from an individual. The Court stated in
Schmerber v. California2 that only evidence of a testimonial or commu-
nicative nature falls within the privilege. In Wade the Court makes it
clear that all speech is not necessarily communicative, even when the
words uttered are those used by the person who committed the crime:
".... he was required to use his voice as an identifying physical char-
acteristic, not to speak his guilt."'3 Mr. Justice Black in his dissent from
this point relies on his dissent in Schmerber,4 where he suggested that
obtaining any evidence from the suspect by compulsion violates the Fifth
Amendment privilege. He does not imply, however, that Schmerber is
43 Kuechner v. Irving Trust, 299 U.S. 445, 452 (1937). Cf. Bailey v. Grover, 88
U.S. 342, 346 (1874).1388 U.S. 218 (1967).
2384 U.S. 757, 761 (1966), where a blood sample was taken from a suspect
(over his objection) to determine its alcohol content.
3 388 U.S. 218, 222-23 (1967).
4 384 U.S. 757, 773 (1966).
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distinguishable on the ground that there the suspect was not required
to speak.
Mr. Justice Fortas, on the other hand, considers Schmerber dis-
tinguishable because in that case the individual was not compelled to
actively cooperate-"to accuse himself by a volitional act. . . ."' His
argument is primarily historical. Nevertheless, history does not support
his position as completely as Mr. Justice Fortas suggests, for it may
also be argued from history that compulsion of the accused to speak for
identification purposes only does not fall within the privilege. "The
privilege against self-incrimination came to be formulated in opposition
to attempts to extract from an accused person a statement concerning
his guilt or innocence."6 [Emphasis added]. Wigmore asserts that "un-
less some attempt is made to secure a communication-written, oral or
otherwise-upon which reliance is to be placed as involving [the ac-
cused's] consciousness of the facts and the operations of his mind in
expressing it, the demand made upon him is not a testimonial one."'
He apparently suggests that the accused may be required to cooperate
fully in the investigation with the exception of testimonial compulsion.8
The cases in which the point has been discussed are in conflict.9 In fact,
not until the decision in Schinerber v. California° was the foundation
laid for some clarification, and not until the decisions in the instant case
and its companion, Gilbert v. California,1 was the issue decided by the
Supreme Court.
388 U.S. 218, 261 (1967).
6 Weintraub, Voice Identification, Writing Exemplars and the Privilege Against
Self-incrimination, 10 VAND. L. REv. 485, 491 (1957).
7 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §2265 (McNaughten rev. 1961).
s Wigmore includes as not violative of the privilege against self-incrimination
fingerprinting, photographing, measuring of a suspect, imprinting of other
portions of a suspect's body, examination of the body for identifying charac-
teristics or evidence of disease or crime, extraction of substance from inside
the body for purposes of analysis, removing clothing from or putting it on
a suspect, requiring a suspect to speak or write for identification, or to appear
in court, stand, assume a stance, walk or make a particular gesture, and to
submit to an examination for sanity. He suggests that requiring a subject to
the use of truth serum or the lie detector is on the boundary line because
his knowledge despite his will to the contrary is extracted. 8 WIGMORE §2265
(McNaughten rev. 1961).
The United States Supreme Court has quite clearly indicated, however,
that lie detector tests and other tests "seemingly directed to obtain 'physical
evidence'" would violate the accused's privilege against self-incrimination
because they "may actually be directed to eliciting responses which are essen-
tially testimonial." Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764 (1966).
See also, cases cited at note 12, infra.
9 Weintraub, Voice Identification, Writing Exemplars and the Privilege Against
Self-incrimination, supra note 6 at 503-05; Compare Aaron v. State, 271 Ala.
70, 122 So.2d 360 (1960); State v. King, 84 N.J. Super. 297, 201 A.2d 758
(1964).
10 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
11388 U.S. 263 (1967), where compelling an accused to give a handwriting ex-
emplar was held not violative of his privilege against self-incrimination. By
analogy, it seems that the use of "voice prints" would not be objectionable on
the ground of self-incrimination.
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Although Mr. Justice Fortas' "active cooperation" test may have a
logical basis, the majority of the Court has decided that the "testimonial
or communicative nature" test is a natural development of the law in
this area and is now firmly established in determining whether or not
the particular compulsion is within the privilege. This decision does not,
of course, preclude state courts from interpreting their state constitu-
tional or statutory provisions regarding self-incrimination according to
Justice Fortas' theory, thereby prohibiting any compulsion of the ac-
cused to speak or "actively cooperate". 12
The remainder of the Court's opinion relates to the right to counsel
claim. The decision is based on the Court's determination that the lineup
is a "critical stage" of the prosecution, and therefore a stage at which
counsel's assistance is necessary to assure a meaningful defense.13 The
standard which the Court will use in deciding whether or not a particular
step in the Government's case is a critical stage is suggested in the Court's
discussion of the various types of physical and chemical identification
tests: "they are not critical stages since there is minimal risk that [the
accused's] counsel's absence at such stages might derogate from his
right to a fair trial."' 4 It seems that the Court will decide the issue on a
case by case basis by determining whether or not the particular proce-
dure involved only a slight risk of violating the accused's constitutional
rights. The majority in Wade found substantial risk in the confrontation
of an accused for identification.
The historical argument of the Court is founded upon the basic
"right to counsel" cases.' 5 The cases decided.prior to Escobedo v. Illi-
nois'G were concerned with the right to counsel either after indictment,
at the time of arraignment, or at some other critical judicial proceeding.
The only major exception is the case of Massiah v. United States.17 In
Massiah there was no judicial proceeding involved, but the suspect had
12 Cf. Weintraub, Voice Identification, Writing Exemplars and the Privilege
Against Self-incrimination, supra note 6 at 490. The Wisconsin Supreme Court
has suggested that the Wisconsin constitution art. I, §8 (privilege against
self-incrimination) may be violated if the accused is forced to cooperate and
he objects, but that there is no violation if the suspect is told what to do and
he does it voluntarily. Rogers v. State, 180 Wis. 568, 571, 193 N.W. 612, 613
(1923) (suspect required to wear clothes similar to those worn by the robber).
The Wisconsin court has also held that the issues of guilt and insanity must
be separated in a criminal trial under certain circumstances because of the
compulsory mental examination, but this decision is based upon the testi-
monial and communicative nature of inculpatory statements made during such
an examination. State ex. rel. LaFollette v. Raskin, 34 Wis.2d 607, 627, 150
N.W.2d 318, 328 (1967).
13388 U.S. 218, 225 (1967).
'14 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967).
's Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) ; Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478(1964) ; Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964) ; Hamilton v. Alabama,
368 U.S. 52 (1961) ; Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
1 378 U.S. 478 (1964).




retained counsel and had been released on bail. Escobedo v. Illinois and
illiranda v. Arizona,8 the first cases to hold that there is a right to coun-
sel before the institution of judicial proceedings, dealt with a suspect's
right to have counsel present to protect his Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination during police interrogation. The Court stated
in Wade, however, that "nothing decided or said in the opinions in the
cited cases links the right to counsel only to the protection of Fifth
Amendment rights."'19 As will be seen later, the Court is concerned in
the instant case with the protection of the accused's sixth amendment
right to confront the witnesses against him.
It may be interesting to speculate as to whether the Court intended
the holding to be limited to an extension of the cases decided prior to
Miranda and Escobedo (since Wade had been indicted and counsel had
been appointed), or whether the right to counsel is extended to all line-
ups, whenever conducted. Such speculation could probably result in only
one conclusion, however, because the attitude and logic of the Court's
opinion as a whole indicate quite clearly that the right is to be extended
to suspects as well as persons accused of crime. This is true in spite of
the generous use of words such as "accused" and "post-indictment"
which taken alone seem to indicate the contrary. Mr. Justice White is
aware of the possibility of a confrontation prior to indictment and con-
cludes:
The rule applies to any lineup, to any other techniques employed
to produce an identification and a fortiori to a face-to-face en-
counter between the witness and the suspect alone, regardless of
when the identification occurs, in time or place, and whether
before or after indictment or information. 0
Justice White's conclusion finds support in logic, for if an accused's
rights are likely to be "irretrievably lost" as the result of a prejudicial
lineup, it would not seem to matter when the lineup occurs.
Another argument of the Court is founded upon commentaries and
cases which relate to the many possibilities of improper suggestion in
identification procedures and the defendant's inability to recognize them
or to establish their existence at trial. The Court points out that the
suggestion may be intentional or unintentional but, in either case, it
may be subtle and undetectable by witnesses and participants. The
Court apparently assumes that counsel are generally able to detect such
improper suggestion. Justice White in his dissent states that the majority
must assume that counsel cannot discover the circumstances of the pre-
trial identification from other sources." Perhaps the majority does not
make this assumption in view of the Supreme Court's apparent desire
is 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
10 388 U.S. 218, 226 (1967).
20 388 U.S. 218, 251 (1967).
21388 U.S. 218, 252-253 (1967).
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to curb improper police practices by its decisions, regardless of whether
there are adequate means to discover them and prevent the use of the
fruits of such practices.2 2 If the accused himself cannot detect prejudicial
suggestion and it is not discoverable from other sources, defense counsel
will not be able to effectively cross-examine the prosecution's witnesses
at trial, for unless counsel is present at the lineup he will not be in a
position to discover the facts and circumstances which may raise the
inference of a prejudicial lineup. To this extent the Court's argument
is well-supported by case law, in that the accused's right to confront
witnesses is denied if he cannot effectively cross-examine them.23
The effect of Wade on both judicial and extrajudicial proceedings
is the final problem to be examined. There is a distinction to be made
between a courtroom identification which is made after a lineup identi-
fication at which the accused's counsel was not present and testimony
concerning the lineup identification itself. As to the former, the instant
case holds that it is not to be excluded per se, but that the prosecution
must be given the opportunity "to establish by clear and convincing evi-
dence that the in-court identifications were based upon observations of
the suspect other than the lineup identification." 24 The Court thus adopts
the rule of Wong Sun v. United States2 5 The test is "whether, granting
establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant
objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or
instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary
taint. '" 28 The problem is, of course, that it is difficult if not impossible
to show that the in-court identification is not the "fruit" of the lineup
identification. 27
As to testimony concerning the lineup identification of the uncoun-
seled participant, which is normally used to bolster the courtroom identi-
fication, the per se exclusionary rule implied in Wade is expressed in
the companion case of Gilbert v. California: "Only a per se exclusionary
rule as to such testimony can be an effective sanction to assure that law
enforcement authorities will respect the accused's constitutional right
to the presence of his counsel at the critical lineup. ' 2
The extension of the right to counsel to extrajudicial proceedings
such as the lineup may not increase the burden upon law enforcement
authorities as much as it might seem. The opinion nowhere states what
the result will be if an accused's counsel is present at a lineup which he
22 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 447 (1966).
23 Cf. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965), and cases cited; See also Smith v.
Illinois, 88 S.Ct. 748 (1968).24 388 U.S. 218, 240 (1967).
25 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963).
26 MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT, 221 (1959).
27 Cf. Justice Black's dissent, 388 U.S. at 248.
28 388 U.S. 263, 273 (1967). It should be noted at this point that the exclusionary
rules of Wade and Gilbert will not be applied retroactively by the Supreme
Court. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
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alleges is prejudicial. There does not seem to be any ground upon which
the accused could refuse to participate in the lineup, because the Court
has also held in the instant case that compelling an accused to participate
in a lineup does not violate his privilege against self-incrimination. The
only possible basis for refusal to participate is that the right to counsel
may not really be meaningful if all counsel can do is raise an objection
at trial; but if counsel were allowed to object to the accused's participa-
tion at the time of the lineup, the identification stage might be "trans-
formed into an adversary proceeding not under the control of a judge."2 9
It is doubtful that the Court intended to do more than preserve the right
to have improperly obtained evidence excluded at trial, for the fear of
exclusion and the resulting heavy burden on the prosecution ought to
be sufficient to insure fairness in the lineup.
The Court also makes the same provision for an "intelligent waiver"
of counsel as it did in Miranda. The opinion does not, however, attempt
to define "intelligent waiver" as it relates to the right to have counsel
present at a lineup. The question of whether or not there has in fact been
an intelligent waiver of counsel will necessarily have to be determined
according to the law of the jurisdiction in which the question arises."0
There is an apparent inconsistency in the Court's decision with re-
gard to courtroom identifications which are not preceded by any prior
confrontations. If the accused is not subjected to any pre-trial confronta-
tion for identification at all, then the first time he will be identified will
be in the courtroom, and there the element of suggestion is obvious.31
This may not be of much significance, however, for if the identity of the
accused is really in question, some type of pre-trial confrontation will be
a necessity. Justice White argues that the prosecution will be prejudicial-
ly delayed in that a suspect will have to be provided counsel before he
can be identified or cleared, which could otherwise be done shortly after
arrest.3 2 This will probably not prove to be too great an additional bur-
den, because the police will, in all likelihood, want to question the
suspect, and their conduct in doing so will be governed by Miranda v.
Arizona,33 so counsel will be required anyway unless waived.
It will be up to the various jurisdictions to apply the Wade decision
29388 U.S. 218, 256 (1967).
30 In Wisconsin guidelines have been set out by the Supreme Court in the case
of State ex. rel. Burnett v. Burke, 22 Wis.2d 486, 492, 126 N.W.2d 91, 95
(1964). If they are not strictly adhered to, however, the waiver of counsel is
not necessarily ineffective. State ex. rel. Kline v. Burke, 27 Wis.2d 40, 45,
133 N.W.2d 405, 407-08 (1965) ; Creighbaum v. State, 35 Wis.2d 17, 24-25, 150
N.W.2d 494, 497 (1967). An important question in Wisconsin is whether or not
the accused has the capacity to understand his circumstances and thus to
intelligently waive his right to counsel. Browne v. State, 24 Wis.2d 491, 511a,
129 N.W.2d 175, 184 (1964). Miranda is quite clear on what does not con-
stitute a waiver. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475-477 (1966).
31 Cf. Justice White's dissent, 388 U.S. at 253.
32388 U.S. 218, 255 (1967).
33384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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to their own criminal procedure. The problem is that the Supreme Court
has not left much room for deviation from the principles laid down. One
question which might arise is whether or not the decision should be
applied retrospectively. It is doubtful that the question will be answered
in the affirmative because this decision is of the type which affects only
a police procedure which was considered acceptable before the deci-
sion.' The only other question which seems to be left open is whether or
not the decision should be limited to its facts-to the situation in which
an accused has been indicted and has retained counsel before he is
placed in a lineup. The foregoing discussion and a recognition that the
Supreme Court is telling state courts and law enforcement agencies to
be aware of and to avoid techniques of identification which may be
suggestive should provide an answer to that question.3 5
THOMAS M. STRASSBurG
Federal Income Taxation: the Commissioner's "Sleep or Rest"
Interpretation Sustained: In United States v. Correll,' the Supreme
Court held that a taxpayer on a business trip may "deduct the cost of
his meals only if his trip requires him to stop for sleep or rest."2 This
decision has effected a renaissance of the Treasury's interpretation,
which had previously endured judicial hostility from the Sixth3 and
Eighth Circuits,4 and the Tax Court,5 while receiving favorable treat-
ment from the First Circuit.6
3 This is the reasoning of the Wisconsin Supreme Court in cases concerning a
rule of federal constitutional law the only effect of which is to strike down
a police procedure acceptable at the time of trial. State ex. rel. LaFollette v.
Raskin, 30 Wis.2d 39, 139 N.W.2d 667 (1966). See also, Riemers v. State,
31 Wis.2d 457, 466, 143 N.W.2d 525, 530 (1966) (Miranda and Escobedo not
to be applied retrospectively in Wisconsin).
35 The Wisconsin Supreme Court has clearly limited Escobedo to its facts and
seems to take a narrower attitude toward the right to counsel than does the
United States Supreme Court. Holloway v. State, 32 Wis.2d 559, 563-565, 146
N.W.2d 441, 443-444 (1966); State v. Burnett, 30 Wis.2d 375, 383-384, 141
N.W.2d 221, 225 (1966) ; Browne v. State, 24 Wis.2d 491, 511f-g, 131 N.V.2d
169, 171-72 (1964). Nevertheless, it is difficult to understand how the Wis-
consin court could narrowly interpret Wade.
' United States v. Correll, 88 S.Ct. 445 (1967).
2 Id. at 445.
3 Correll v. United States, 369 F.2d 87 (6th Cir. 1966), where the Court held
"the Commissioner's overnight or sleep or rest rule, bears no rational relation
to the business necessity of the meal expenses". Id. at 89.
4 Hanson v. Commissioner, 289 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1962), where the Court er-
roneously relied on Williams v. Patterson, Note 16 infra, to allow a deduc-
tion where the taxpayer did not obtain sleep or rest.
5William v. Bagley, 46 T.C. 176 (1966), where the Tax Court abandoned the
previously strict adherence to the overnight rule as the sole criteria of deter-
mining the business travel deduction.
6 Commissioner v. Bagley, 374 F.2d 204 (1st Cir. 1967), where the court held
"that fairness to the greatest number of people, and at the same time a
practical administrative approach which will not permit every meal-purchasing
taxpayer to take pot lunch in the courts, is to accept the Commissioner's
Sleep or Rest Rule." Id. at 207.
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